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Trial Practice and Procedure
by C. Frederick Overby*
and
Jason Crawford*"
I.

INTRODUCTION

Developments in the law interpreting and applying the Official Code
of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section 9-11-9.1, the professional
negligence affidavit pleading requirement, and Georgia's various statutes
of ultimate repose overshadowed the usual decisions concerning personal
jurisdiction, service of process, and venue. This review will analyze the
developments in these areas of trial practice and procedure in Georgia
for the survey period. Also, the authors will discuss new developments
concerning Georgia's renewal and dismissal statutes, res judicata, and
discovery.
II.

O.C.G.A. SECTION 9-11-9.1

The Georgia appellate courts have been inconsistent in their interpretation and application of O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1, the malpractice
affidavit pleading requirement, since the statute's enactment in 1987.
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The statute sets out the proper form and content of an expert's affidavit,
which must be attached to any complaint alleging professional negligence in order for the complaint to state a claim.' Failure to follow the
requirements of this statute will result in dismissal of the claim with
prejudice.2
During this survey period, the courts clouded the waters significantly.
In a confusing and often contradictory series of cases, the appellate
courts addressed the sufficiency of the form and content of a malpractice
affidavit, as well as the applicability of the affidavit requirement. After
another year of addressing varied factual scenarios and inability to reach
a workable solution under the statute as written and many times
amended, the court of appeals, in one holding, seemingly retreated to the
general and liberal pleading requirements of the Georgia Civil Practice
Act.3 Whether this holding marks a fundamental change in the
interpretation and application of this statute or an isolated aberration
is unclear.
A. Affidavits Made Pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1
Should the Court Liberally Construe the Statute, Not Liberally
Construe the Statute, or Does it Matter? Striking examples of the
confusion surrounding O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1 can be found by
examining two cases decided within four months of each other, Sisk v.
Patel4 and Raskin v. Wallace.5 Both cases address how a court should
decide a motion to dismiss based upon a plaintiff's failure to follow the
precise affidavit form requirements of the statute.
Both cases initially cite the seminal case of Gadd v. Wilson & Co.,
Engineers & Architects.6 In Gadd, the Supreme Court of Georgia held
that
since § 9-11-9.1 establishes an "exception to the general liberality of
pleading permitted under [the Civil Practice Act]," it should be
construed in a manner consistent with the liberality of the Civil
Practice Act where such construction does not detract from the purpose
of § 9-11-9.1 "to reduce the number of frivolous malpractice suits being
filed."7

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 (1993).
Id.
Sisk v. Patel, 217 Ga. App. 156, 160, 456 S.E.2d 718, 720 (1995).
217 Ga. App. 156, 456 S.E.2d 718 (1995).
215 Ga. App. 603, 451 S.E.2d 485 (1994).
262 Ga. 234, 416 S.E.2d 285 (1992).
Id. at 235, 416 S.E.2d at 285 (citations omitted).
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At this point, however, the cases depart in inexplicably divergent
directions, one heeding the directive of Gadd, the other ignoring it
altogether. Raskin was a psychiatric malpractice case filed by an inmate
incarcerated for murdering his wife. The inmate, James Raskin, sued
his treating psychiatrist for allegedly failing to hospitalize Raskin after
he threatened his wife's life. Along with the complaint, in attempt to
comply with O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1, Raskin filed his own affidavit,
referencing an uncertified copy of certain portions of the criminal trial
transcript in which Raskin was convicted for the murder of his wife.
The referenced portions of transcript contained the trial testimony of a
board certified psychiatrist, Dr. Harold Clifford Morgan, who opined that
Raskin's physician, Dr. Wallace, should have hospitalized Raskin after
Raskin threatened his wife's life.'
In its analysis, the court of appeals first conceded that the Georgia
Supreme Court in Gadd held that O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1 should be
liberally construed so long as such a construction does not detract from
the purpose of deterring frivolous suits.' The court next conceded that
it had previously allowed, in Hospital Authority of Fulton County v.
McDaniel,0 in lieu of an affidavit," an expert's deposition from an
original action to be incorporated into the complaint in a renewed action
"complied with the spirit, if not the letter, of
because such an allowance
1
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1." 2
The court next conceded that Raskin's affidavit demonstrated
attempted compliance. 3 The court even conceded that
given Dr. Morgan's [trial] testimony that Raskin's doctor should have
immediately hospitalized him when he made the death threats against
his wife and warned Mrs. Raskin as well as the fact that Dr. Morgan
gave the factual basis for this opinion, it is likely that Raskin's
complaint against Wallace is not frivolous. 4
At this point, one would expect the court to hold that Raskin's complaint
stated a claim in keeping with the liberal construction of pleadings
under the Civil Practice Act. But this was not the case.

8. Raskin, 215 Ga. App. at 603-04, 451 S.E.2d at 425.
9. Id. at 604-05, 451 S.E.2d at 486.
10. 192 Ga. App. 398, 385 S.E.2d 8 (1989).
11. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1(a) requires a plaintiff to file an affidavit contemporaneously
with the complaint in a malpractice case. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1(a).
12. 215 Ga. App. at 605, 451 S.E.2d at 486.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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Notwithstanding the fact that Raskin's complaint appeared meritorious and that his pleadings under Gadd ought to be liberally construed,
the court focused upon the technical wording of the statute.15 The
court held that because O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1 requires an affidavit
of an "expert competent to testify," and the affidavit the plaintiff filed
(his own) was not such an affidavit, the complaint was properly
dismissed.6

The court never explained why it focused on the technical aspect of the
statutory language "expert competent to testify," when the claim was
admittedly not frivolous, yet be so liberal and accepting of compliance
with merely the spirit of the statute with respect to the term affidavit
in McDaniel.7 It is impossible to explain this distinction. Dr. Morgan
was, in fact, an expert competent to testify. 8 It seems the court of
appeals dismissed the claim because the affidavit was not that of Dr.
Morgan. If this were true, cases like McDaniel would appear to be
indistinguishable. The court likewise never addressed the obvious
question: How would a plaintiff in Raskin's position, with a claim that
at least appeared meritorious on its face, go about asserting it?
Four months later, the court of appeals decided Sisk, a malpractice
action wherein the plaintiff filed a facsimile copy of his expert's affidavit
with his complaint. The defendant moved to dismiss arguing that Sisk's
facsimile copy of his expert's affidavit was not an affidavit as required
by the statute. The trial court agreed and dismissed Sisk's complaint.' 9
Reversing the trial court, the court of appeals again first turned to
Gadd.2 ° If the claim appeared to be non-frivolous, the pleadings would
be liberally construed. 2 Since the facsimile copy demonstrated, and
the defendant did not dispute, that an expert deemed the action to have
factual merit, "no question of frivolity" existed. The court was thus
free to liberally construe the statute.23
In connection with that liberal construction, the court noted that an
affidavit is subject to stricter evidentiary requirements at the summary
judgment stage than at the pleading stage.24 An affidavit that would

15. Id.
16. Id.

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

192 Ga. App. at 398, 385 S.E.2d at 8.
215 Ga. App. at 605, 451 S.E.2d at 486.
Sisk v. Patel, 217 Ga. App. 156, 157, 456 S.E.2d 718, 718-19 (1995).
Id. at 158, 456 S.E.2d at 719.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 158-59, 456 S.E.2d at 720.
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be insufficient at the summary judgment stage
could be sufficient at the
2 5
pleading stage "when justice so requires."

As if for good measure, the court disavowed its recent holding in
Brown v. Middle Georgia Hospital,28
which would require application of the [Renewal Statute] in those
instances in which a facsimile was filed, rendering the filing of a
facsimile an amendable defect. Under [the Renewal Statute] the
original affidavit would have had to have been in the physical
possession of counsel at the time of filing, and the facsimile filed as a
result of a mistake. 7
According to the court,
the better approach should be to allow the filing of a facsimile of a
properly executed affidavit with a complaint in a professional malpractice action so as to avoid the running of the statute of limitation. Then
the original should be allowed to be filed as a supplemental pleading,
without requiring the action to be "renewed."28
It seems that at least as far as the court of appeals is concerned, the
term "affidavit" is to be more liberally construed than the phrase "expert
competent to testify." As illogical as it seems, had Mr. Raskin simply
filed no affidavit at all and merely attached the pertinent copies of Dr.
Morgan's trial transcript, under McDaniel3" and Sisk, these materials
would have constituted as much of an affidavit as the deposition in
McDaniel and the facsimile in Sisk. Conversely, if the plaintiffs in
McDaniel and Sisk had filed their own personal affidavits incorporating
the deposition and the facsimile, according to the rationale in Raskin,
those cases would have been properly dismissed. Obviously, such hairsplitting is illogical if in both cases the court was truly liberally
construing the statute so as to do justice.
When is an Expert "Competent to Testify"? It is well established
that a malpractice affidavit must be that of an expert competent to
testify31 and that the court of appeals may not be as willing to liberally
construe that language. 2 What if your expert is a teacher and not a

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 159, 456 S.E.2d at 720.
211 Ga. App. 884, 440 S.E.2d 687 (1994).
217 Ga. App. at 159, 456 S.E.2d at 720 (emphasis in original).
Id.
Both terms appear in O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1(a).
192 Ga. App. 398, 385 S.E.2d 8 (1989).
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1(a).
See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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practitioner? According to the court of appeals, the plaintiff should
secure another expert.33 In Riggins v. Wyatt, 4 the court of appeals
held that a professor who is not licensed to practice and who does not
practice within his area of expertise is incompetent to testify against a
practitioner.5 Accordingly, an affidavit from such a professor, regardless of his credentials reflecting extensive education and training, is not
sufficient to satisfy O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1. 36
Content: To Incorporate or not to Incorporate, that is the
Question? Once a practitioner has obtained the opinion of an expert
competent to testify, as is required before suit is filed, the issue arises
as to how much to include in the affidavit and how much information
should be incorporated by reference. In Crook v. Funk," the court of
appeals reaffirmed that notwithstanding Gadd, an O.C.G.A. section 9-119.1 affidavit "cannot incorporate by reference matters required by
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 to be set forth in the body of the affidavit."' The
court held that because the plaintiff's affidavit set forth at least one
negligent act or omission of each defendant and the factual basis
therefore, the affidavit was sufficient. 9 It is therefore prudent for the
practitioner to take great care to ensure that the information contained
in the affidavit is sufficient standing alone to comply with the statute.
Content: What Factual Basis Must Be Included? In Crook,
Fidelity Enterprises, Inc. v. Beltran,0 and Hutchinson v. Divorce &
Custody Law Center of Arline Kerman & Associates,4 the court of
appeals prescribed what information satisfies the O.C.G.A. section 9-119.1 requirement that a factual basis be shown for at least one negligent
act or omission. In contrast to O.C.G.A. section 9-11-56, which imposes
an evidentiary requirement at the procedural juncture of a motion for
summary judgment, O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1 imposes a mere pleading
requirement at the time of filing.4" Thus, an affidavit which would not

33. Riggins v. Wyatt, 215 Ga. App. 854, 855, 452 S.E.2d 577, 578 (1994).
34. 215 Ga. App. 854, 452 S.E.2d 577 (1994).
35. Id. at 855, 452 S.E.2d at 578.
36. Id. As noted by the dissent, the majority ignored, without explanation, supreme
court and court of appeals authority that "any person learned in medical or physiological
matters is qualified to testify as an expert thereon, even though he is not a medical
practitioner." Id. at 856, 452 S.E.2d at 579.
37. 214 Ga. App. 213, 447 S.E.2d 60 (1994).
38. Id. at 213, 447 S.E.2d at 61.
39. Id. at 214, 447 S.E.2d at 62.
40. 214 Ga. App. 205, 447 S.E.2d 150 (1994).
41. 215 Ga.App. 25, 449 S.E.2d 866 (1994).
42. Bowen v.Adams, 203 Ga. App. 123, 123, 416 S.E.2d 102, 102 (1992).
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be sufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment may nonetheless be sufficient to satisfy the pleading requirements of O.C.G.A. section
9-11-9.1. Unless the affidavit demonstrates that the plaintiff is not
the affidavit satisfies the
entitled to relief under any state of facts,
4
requirements of O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1. 3
According to the court in Crook, the affidavit need only specify the
dates and procedure performed (or, implicitly, not performed if a
negligent omission amounted to the breach of care) and why the
treatment should have been handled differently.44 Judge Pope wrote
in Beltran, "[it is sufficient to state what the defendant did not do that
he should have done (or vice versa)."45 The factual bases of the claim
and the allegations of negligence need not be stated in separate
sentences.4' Likewise, it is not a valid objection that the affidavit
contains conclusory allegations so long as it sets forth factual allegations
which, if true, support at least one negligent act or omission. 47 "It need
not state admissible facts or facts sufficient to withstand a motion for
summary judgment."4"
B.

Applicability of O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1

Over the years, the courts have held that O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1
applies to any claim against a "professional" based upon negligence or
a deviation from the standard of care (malpractice).49 The cases define
professional as one who can legally carry on an occupation upon
obtaining a license to do so pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 43-1-24, and
persons who pursue certain occupations defined as professions by
O.C.G.A. section 14-7-2(2) or section 14-10-2(2).50
When Affidavit is not Required: Claims for Ordinary Negligence. Assuming a defendant is a professional, is any claim against
that person subject to the pleading requirements of O.C.G.A. section 911-9.1? Obviously, the answer to that question is "no". The courts

43. Crook v. Funk, 214 Ga. App. 213, 214, 447 S.E.2d 60, 62 (1994); Fidelity Enters.,
Inc. v. Beltran, 214 Ga. App. 205, 205-06, 447 S.E.2d 150, 151-52 (1994); Hutcherson, 215
Ga. App. at 26, 449 S.E.2d at 867-68.
44. Crook, 214 Ga. App. at 214, 447 S.E.2d at 62.
45. Beltran, 214 Ga. App. at 206, 447 S.E.2d at 151.
46. 214 Ga. App. at 214-15, 447 S.E.2d at 62.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 215, 447 S.E.2d at 62.
49. Gillis v. Goodman, 262 Ga. 117, 118, 414 S.E.2d 197, 198 (1992).

50. Id.

360

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

quickly established that no affidavit is necessary if the claim is one for
ordinary negligence, as opposed to professional negligence. 51
The court of appeals reaffirmed this principal during the survey
period. In Raley v. Terminix International Co.,"2 the court held that
allegations questioning the performance of professional services in a
defendant's area of expertise, "rather than... [alleging) negligence in
the performance of administrative, clerical or routine acts which require
no special expertise," require an accompanying malpractice affidavit."
Since the plaintiff in Raley alleged negligent rendition of professional
services, the claim was one for professional negligence.54
Robinson v. Medical Center of Central Georgia,5" which also addressed the issue of when a claim constitutes ordinary negligence or
professional negligence, highlighted the plaintiff's lawyer's need to err
on the side of filing a malpractice affidavit. In that case, the plaintiff
claimed the defendant hospital's agents negligently left the plaintiff's
bed rails in a down position. The hospital moved to dismiss, claiming
that the plaintiff did not file a malpractice affidavit. The hospital
attached an affidavit of a senior registered nurse describing the
hospital's fall risk protocol, which allowed nurses to determine, in their
professional judgment, when bed rails should be put up or left down.5"
The trial court dismissed the claim, and the court of appeals affirmed, distinguishing Smith v. North Fulton Medical Center.5" In
Smith, the court held that the nurse's failure to follow a nurse's
assessment which mandated that the bed rails be left up constituted
ordinary negligence.59 No such prior written protocols existed in
Robinson."0 The court's attempts to distinguish Smith are, however,
incomplete. If the hospital's nurses in Robinson failed to exercise their
professional judgment as to whether to put up the bed rails (i.e., if they
had not gotten around to it yet or simply forgot- facts that might have
been later developed in discovery), a claim for ordinary negligence would

51. See, e.g., HCA Health Servs. of Ga., Inc. v. Hampshire, 206 Ga. App. 108, 113, 424
S.E.2d 293, 298 (1992) (holding hospital's furnishing defective equipment constitutes
ordinary, as opposed to medical, negligence); Jones v. Bates, 261 Ga. 240, 242, 403 S.E.2d

804, 806 (1991) (involding a decision regarding removal of heat shield from lamp to
increase lighting one of simple negligence).
52. 215 Ga. App. 324, 450 S.E.2d 343 (1994).
53. Id. at 325, 450 S.E.2d at 345.
54. Id.
55. 217 Ga. App. 8, 456 S.E.2d 254 (1995).
56. Id. at 8-9, 456 S.E.2d at 255.
57. Id. at 9-10, 456 S.E.2d at 256.
58. 200 Ga. App. 464, 408 S.E.2d 468 (1991).
59. Id. at 465-66, 408 S.E.2d at 469-70.
60. 217 Ga. App. at 10, 456 S.E.2d at 256.
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exist under the reasoning of Smith. The court failed to carry its analysis
this far, even though the hospital's affidavit apparently failed to provide
this information.
Other Claims: Breach of Fiduciary Duty; Fraud. During the
survey period, the Supreme Court of Georgia held that a claim for
tortious breach of the lawyer's fiduciary duty not to obtain and use
confidential client information to one's own advantage rests not upon
negligent performance of legal services, but upon independent ethical
requirements imposed by the attorney-client relationship.61 Accordingly, the law requires no malpractice affidavit to state such a claim. 62
The court of appeals held similarly with respect to a claim for fraud
made against an attorney since all persons have a general duty not to
defraud."
In Tante v. Herring,4 the plaintiffs, a husband and wife, accused the
defendant lawyer of legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty by
engaging in an adulterous affair with the wife while representing her. 5
The court ruled that a claim for legal malpractice cannot be asserted if
the lawyer undisputedly obtained the results for the client for which the
lawyer was retained.6 6 As to the plaintiffs' claims for breach of the
lawyer's fiduciary duty, the court held that such a claim could be
asserted.67 Such a claim, however, requires no malpractice affidavit
because the claim is "not based on negligence involving [the lawyer's]
performance of legal services."'
In Hodge v. Jennings Mill, Ltd.,69 the plaintiff brought an action
against his previous attorney sounding in tort for legal malpractice,
breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and a contract claim for failure to
properly render the legal performance contracted.7" The court held that
a malpractice affidavit is required, regardless of how the plaintiff casts
his claim, only "where the claim is based upon the failure of the
professional to meet the requisite standards of the subject profession."7 '

61.

Tante v. Herring, 264 Ga. 694, 695, 453 S.E.2d 686, 687 (1994).

62. Id.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Hodge v. Jennings Mill, Ltd., 215 Ga. App. 507, 507, 451 S.E.2d 66, 67 (1994).
264 Ga. 694, 453 S.E.2d 686 (1994).
Id. at 694, 453 S.E.2d at 687.
Id. at 694-95, 453 S.E.2d at 687.
Id. at 695, 453 S.E.2d at 687.
Id.
215 Ga. App. 507, 451 S.E.2d 66 (1994).
Id. at 507, 451 S.E.2d at 67.
Id. at 508, 451 S.E.2d at 68.
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The court held that a claim for fraud is not such a claim.7" Everyone
should be familiar with the standard, "Thou shalt not defraud," and this
standard applies to everyone, including professionals.7"
The court in Hodge, without any analysis whatsoever, dismissed the
plaintiff's claim for breach of fiduciary duty.74 If Hodge is to be
reconciled with Tante, we are only left to assume that in Hodge the
alleged breach of fiduciary duty involved "the failure of the professional
to meet the requisite standard of the subject profession."7" Whereas in
Tante, perhaps, all lawyers are familiar with the standard "Thou shalt
not commit adultery with your client." One must wonder, nonetheless,
that if the alleged breach of the fiduciary duty in Hodge was the fraud,
as to which everyone is presumed to know the standard, how would this
claim be based any more upon the lawyer's failure to meet the applicable
standard of care than the fraud action? One can only wonder based on
these decisions.
C. Timing: O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1(b)
O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1(b) allows plaintiffs who file suit within ten
days of the expiration of the applicable limitations period forty-five
additional days to supplement their pleadings with a sufficient
malpractice affidavit.76 To come within this exception, the plaintiff
must allege that a sufficient affidavit could not have been prepared and
filed contemporaneously with the complaint because of the eminent
expiration of the statute of limitations. 7 Finally, "[t]he trial court may,
on motion, after hearing and for good cause extend such time as it shall
determine justice requires."78
Dixon u. Barnes79 involved a plaintiff who invoked this subsection in
his complaint. The plaintiff failed, however, to move for an extension of
time or to file an affidavit until seven weeks after the expiration of the
additional forty-five day period. The trial court nevertheless denied the
defendant's motion to dismiss. 80
The court of appeals reversed, holding that O.C.G.A. section 9-119.1(b) carves out specific time limitations for filing affidavits.81

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 509, 451 S.E.2d at 68.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 508, 451 S.E.2d at 68.
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1(b).
Id.
Id.
214 Ga. App. 7, 446 S.E.2d 774 (1994).

80.

Id. at 8, 446 S.E.2d at 775.

81.

Id. at 9-10, 446 S.E.2d at 776-77.
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Accordingly, O.C.G.A. section 9-11-6(b) which pertains generally to
extensions of filing periods for cause shown and to the trial court's
discretion to allow an act to be done outside the time prescribed by law
in the case of excusable neglect, is inapplicable.8 2
Under O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1, the question now becomes whether
the statute mandates that the plaintiff move for an extension prior to
the expiration of the forty-five day period. To answer this question, the
court turned its focus back to O.C.G.A. section 9-11-6(b). 83
That enactment addresses two distinct situations: (1) it allows the
court for cause shown to order a time period extended upon motion made
prior to the expiration of the original period; and (2) the statute allows
the court, upon the higher showing of excusable neglect, to grant leave
for a party to do an act outside the prescribed time period for doing that
act.84 Because O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1(b) only allows the court to
extend the time period and, unlike O.C.G.A. section 9-11-6(b), makes no
provision for doing the act outside the applicable time period, the court
reasoned that the legislature intended that an extension only be allowed
if the motion were made within the forty-five day extension."
As noted by the court, this construction makes sense because O.C.G.A.
section 9-11-9.1(c) allows the defendant thirty days from the filing of the
affidavit to file an answer.8" To hold otherwise places defendants in
malpractice actions in the position of dangling in limbo indefinitely, not
knowing when, or even if they will need to file an answer to the
plaintiff's charges.8 7
D. 0.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1 and Dismissal or Renewal
What does a plaintiff's lawyer in a malpractice case do after filing suit
without attaching an affidavit to comply with O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1?
The answer depends upon whether the statute of limitations has run on
the claim. If the limitations period has expired, recent decisions
preclude dismissal and renewal, pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 9-2-61. If
it has not, survey cases allow dismissal and re-filing within the
applicable period of limitations. 8

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 8, 446 S.E.2d at 776.
Id. at 9, 446 S.E.2d at 776.
Id. at 8, 446 S.E.2d at 776. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-6(b).
214 Ga. App. at 9, 446 S.E.2d at 776.
Id. at 10, 446 SE.2d at 776-77. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1(c).
214 Ga. App. at 10, 446 S.E.2d at 777.
See infra notes 89-102 and accompanying text.
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The former situation was recently addressed by the court of appeals
in Fidelity Enterprises,Inc. v. Beltran, 9 in which the plaintiff filed a
legal malpractice claim against his former lawyer and the lawyer's firm.
Contemporaneously, the plaintiff filed an O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1
affidavit. The defendants challenged the sufficiency of the affidavit in
their answer and filed a motion to dismiss. The plaintiff filed a second
affidavit and later voluntarily dismissed his case. The plaintiff re-filed,
pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 9-2-61, within six months of his voluntary
dismissal but after the statute of limitations would otherwise have run
on his claim. Along with the renewed action, the plaintiff filed a third
affidavit. Again, the defendants moved to dismiss.9"
The court of appeals held that because no evidence existed to show the
plaintiff possessed the latter two affidavits and the failure to attach
them to the original complaint resulted from a mistake, O.C.G.A. section
9-11-9.1(e) and (f) barred their consideration. 9 ' Accordingly, in passing
upon the motion to dismiss, the court could only consider the originally
as
filed affidavit. If that affidavit was insufficient, the original action
92
filed contained a non-amendable defect and was an invalid suit.
The holding in Beltran as it pertains to Georgia's Renewal Statute was
dictated by the plain terms of O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1(f). That
subsection expressly limits a plaintiff's ability to renew, pursuant to
O.C.G.A. section 9-2-61, an action in which the plaintiff originally failed
to comply with O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1 after the expiration of the
applicable limitations period.93 O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1(e) similarly limits
a plaintiff's ability to amend a complaint to add an affidavit, pursuant
the plaintiff initially failed to comply
to O.C.G.A. section 9-11-15, when
94
9-11-9.1.
section
O.C.G.A.
with
Consider a situation where the statute of limitations has not run on
the plaintiff's claim. Whether intentionally or unintentionally, O.C.G.A.
section 9-11-9.1 fails to address the situation where plaintiffs voluntarily dismiss their case pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 9-11-41 within the
statute of limitations for the claim and refile within the statute of
limitations. 5 O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1(f) would not apply to bar the
suit because the second action would not have been renewed outside the
applicable statute of limitations pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 9-2-61. 96

89. 214 Ga. App. 205, 447 S.E.2d 150 (1994).
90. Id. at 205, 447 S.E.2d at 151.
91. Id.

92. Id.
93. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1(0.
94. Beltran, 214 Ga. App. at 205, 447 S.E.2d at 151.
95. Compare O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 with O.C.G.A. § 9-11-41 (1993).

96. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1(f); O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61 (1982 & Supp. 1995).
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O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1(e) would not foreclose the second suit, as this
subsection only prevents amendments which add a proper affidavit.9 7
For years this question went unanswered. On one hand, O.C.G.A.
section 9-11-9.1 appears comprehensive. An argument could be made
that the General Assembly, by strictly limiting the ordinarily liberal
amendment of pleadings allowed by O.C.G.A. section 9-11-15 and by
limiting the ability to dismiss and renew outside the statute of
limitations, intended to limit the ability to correct noncompliance with
the procedural requirements of O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1. On the other
hand, pleadings in general under the Civil Practice Act are to be
liberally construed. O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1 derogates from this
universally accepted liberality, and because the filing of a subsequent
claim within the statute of limitations with an appropriate affidavit
demonstrates nonfrivolity, limitations not contained within the express
terms of the statute should not be read into it by the courts. "
In Moritz v. Orkin Exterminating Co." and Orkin Exterminating Co.
v. Carder,"° the court of appeals took the latter position. 1 The
court held that reading in a prohibition precluding dismissal and refiling
within the statute of limitations would render O.C.G.A. section 9-119.1(f) meaningless (which precludes renewal under
O.C.G.A. section 9-20 2
61) when the statute of limitations has run.1
E.

Preclusive Effect of O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1

What happens to a wrongful death claim when the victim suffers
injury as a result of the malpractice of another, files suit for personal
injury attaching no affidavit, the suit is dismissed with prejudice, and
the victim subsequently dies as a result of the same negligent acts or
omissions? According to the court of appeals in Greene County Hospital
Authority v. Waldroup, °3 the claim would be barred by collateral
estoppel.'
In Waldroup, the plaintiff originally filed malpractice claims on behalf
of her incapacitated husband and herself for loss of consortium. The
claims were subsequently dismissed upon motion by the trial court for

97. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1(c).
98. See Gadd v Wilson & Co., Eng'rs, & Architects, 262 Ga. 234, 235, 416 SE.2d 285,
286 (1992).
99. 215 Ga. App. 255, 450 S.E.2d 233 (1994).
100. 215 Ga. App. 257, 450 S.E.2d 217 (1994).
101. 215 Ga. App. at 255, 450 S.E.2d at 233; 215 Ga. App. at 257, 450 S.E.2d at 217.
102. 215 Ga. App. at 256, 450 S.E.2d at 234.
103. 215 Ga. App. 344, 451 S.E.2d 62 (1994).
104. Id. at 348, 451 S.E.2d at 66.
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failure to file a sufficient affidavit in compliance with O.C.G.A. section
9-11-9.1. When the plaintiff's husband later died, she filed a claim
against the same defendants for the wrongful death of her husband,
attaching an appropriate affidavit. The question for the court of appeals
to decide was straight-forward: "Under the above facts, is an indisputably separate claim for wrongful death barred by a previous dismissal
of the victim's personal injury claim which arose from the identical
facts? 10 5
The court of appeals, Judge Smith writing, first distinguished between
and defined the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel." e Res
judicata would not bar the claim because that doctrine only bars claims
that were brought or could have been brought in the original suit.0 7
The wrongful death claim could not have been brought with the prior
personal injury claims because the victim was not yet dead. Therefore,
the court next turned to the doctrine of collateral estoppel.' 5
Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the court noted, "The second
action is upon a different cause of action and the judgment in the prior
suit precludes re-litigation [sic] of issues actually litigated and necessary
to the outcome of the first action.""° The court reasoned that because
a dismissal for failure to file a sufficient affidavit is a dismissal on the
merits, the underlying malpractice claim was actually litigated.10
Collateral estoppel thus applied to preclude relitigation of the same
issues in the wrongful death case.' The court held that the issue is
not required to have been actually litigated before a jury as long as it
was actually litigated and decided by the court." 2 As support for its
conclusion, the court cited a 1948 decision which held that a judgment
based upon the statute of limitations or laches is a judgment "on the
merits."" 3
The court of appeals, however, appears to have been mixing apples
with oranges. The question is not whether a decision was on the merits.
The question for collateral estoppel purposes is whether the issue was
actually litigated.1 4 The court of appeals is correct that the issue does

105. Id. at 344-45, 451 S.E.2d at 63-64.
106. Id. at 345, 451 S.E.2d at 64.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 346, 451 S.E.2d at 65.
109. Id. at 345, 45 S.E.2d at 64.
110. Id. at 346, 451 S.E.2d at 65.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 347, 451 S.E.2d at 65.
113. Id.
114. See Sorrells Constr. Co. v. Chandler Armentrout & Roebuck, P.C., 214 Ga. App.
193, 194, 447 S.E.2d 101, 102 (1994).
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not have to have been decided by the jury, but the issue has to have been
actually litigated."'
It is beyond question that a dismissal for failure to file a sufficient
malpractice affidavit is a dismissal on the merits."' The only thing
on the merits has meant in this context, however, is that the dismissal
is with prejudice." ' In other words, the dismissal is final for res
judicata purposes. The same plaintiff cannot sue the same defendant
again based upon the same cause of action.
The same is true with respect to a dismissal based upon the expiration
of the statute of limitations. A dismissal based upon the expiration of
the statute of limitations, the very example employed by the court of
appeals, although sufficient for res judicata purposes, has been held
insufficient to constitute actual litigation for purposes of collateral
estoppel, even though such a dismissal is on the merits.'
The only thing actually litigated when a claim is dismissed based upon
the expiration of the statute of limitations is the applicability of the
statute of limitations to the claim asserted by the plaintiff. Similarly,
as inexplicably conceded by the court of appeals in Waldroup, the only
thing actually litigated in the original personal injury action in that case
was the insufficiency of the malpractice affidavit in the context of those
claims in that case."i9
Oddly, in Sorrells Construction Co. v. Chandler Armentrout &
Roebuck, P.C.'2 ° and Thornton v. Ware County Hospital Authority,'2'
the court of appeals, in opinions joined in and authored by Judge Smith,
held that a voluntary dismissal of employee defendants with prejudice
is on the merits but nonetheless does not preclude suit against their
employer under respondeat superior. 2 ' Those claims were voluntarily
dismissed on the merits, but, as the court pointed out, the underlying
issues of negligence of the servants was not actually litigated.'23
Collateral estoppel, for that reason, did not apply.

115. Id. at 194, 447 S.E.2d at 102.
116. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1. See Lutz v. Foran, 262 Ga. 819, 824, 427 S.E.2d 248, 252
(1993).

117. 262 Ga. at 824, 427 S.E.2d at 252.
118, See Humana, Inc. v. Davis, 261 Ga. 514, 407 S.E.2d 725 (1991) (Actual litigation

of statute of limitations defense on the merits as to one defendant did not preclude finding
that defendant's principal was vicariously liable for defendant's negligence.).
119. Waldroup, 215 Ga. App. at 346, 451, S.E.2d at 65.
120. 214 Ga. App. 193, 447 S.E.2d 101 (1994).
121. 215 Ga. App. 276, 450 S.E.2d 260 (1994).
122. 214 Ga. App. at 195,447 S.E.2d at 103-04; 215 Ga. App. at 278,450 S.E.2d at 262.

123. Id.
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In Waldroup, because the substantive claims for malpractice, likewise,
were not actually litigated (even though they were dismissed on the
merits) and because the plaintiff's affidavits in the subsequent wrongful
death statute apparently complied with O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1, the
claim for wrongful death, it would logically follow, should not have been
foreclosed. 24 These decisions seem to be impossible to reconcile.
As just one year of decisions indicate, this statute has caused
confusion and added a layer of litigation with motions related solely to
compliance with the statute, even in cases which are admittedly
nonfrivolous. Several judges from the court of appeals agree. According
to Judge Johnson, in a scathing attack upon the efficacy of the statute
(an opinion joined by Judges McMurray, Birdsong, Pope, Blackburn, and
Smith) the malpractice pleading requirement's:
[Hlistory ... in the appellate courts has shown beyond a reasonable
doubt that it is only with great difficulty made workable in the
practical arena of litigation, and has largely failed to achieve its

purpose of reducing frivolous litigation. Rather, it has created an
added layer of motions regarding the sufficiency of affidavits preceding
the motions for summary judgment on the merits. Rather than
continuing to interpret and reconcile subsection after subsection added
to the statute by the legislature in attempts to fix what is fundamentally broken, the better approach is to construe pleadings liberally
to
12
do substantial justice in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 9-11-8(f). 1
Perhaps the General Assembly will heed this call and repeal this illconceived enactment altogether.
III. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS/STATUTE OF REPOSE ISSUES
The Georgia General Assembly has enacted several statutes of
ultimate repose. 12 6 Statutes of ultimate repose act like statutes of

limitations in that they bar certain claims if not filed before the
expiration of the prescribed time period.
They differ from statutes of limitations in that statutes of ultimate
repose are almost uniformly interpreted to be the outer time limit for the
127
filing of a claim, enacted to provide defendants and their insurers

124. In a decision announced beyond the timeframe of cases analyzed in this survey,
the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the decision of the court of appeals in this case.
Waldroup v. Greene County Hosp. Auth., 265 Ga. 864, 463 S.E.2d 5 (1995).
125. Sisk v. Patel, 217 Ga. App. 156, 159-60, 456 S.E.2d 718, 720 (1995).
126. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. §§ 9-3-71 (1982 & Supp. 1995), 9-3-51 (1982), 51-1-11(b)&(c)
(1982 & Supp. 1995).
127. See Love v. Whirlpool Corp., 264 Ga. 701,449 S.E.2d 602; 214 Ga. App. 259, 447
S.E.2d 617 (1994).
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with a date certain beyond which they can rest without fear of litigation.
Accordingly, courts generally hold that statutes of ultimate repose,
unlike statutes of limitations, are not subject to the "discovery rule.""'8
For choice of law purposes, statutes of ultimate repose are generally
considered substantive, unlike procedural statutes of limitations.'29
Finally, statutes of ultimate repose generally run without regard for
when the plaintiff's cause of action accrued.
During the survey period, several interesting issues cropped up
surrounding the interpretation of some of Georgia's statutes of limitations and statutes of ultimate repose. The courts decided cases
concerning the Georgia five year statute of ultimate repose for medical
malpractice claims, 3 ° the eight year statute pertaining to actions
arising from improvements to real property,' 31 and the ten year statute
for product liability claims.'3 2 The court also charted new territory in
interpreting traditional statutes of limitation.
A.

Statutes of Limitations

Applicability: Which Statute of Limitation Applies? In Reaugh
v. Inner HarborHospital,Ltd.,'3' the court of appeals held that specific
statutes of limitations that address a plaintiff's particular claim
supersede general statutes of limitation, such as O.C.G.A. section 9-3-33,
which sets a general two year limitation upon actions for injury to the
person.'
In that case, the plaintiff sued the operators of the infamous Anneewakee treatment facility. The plaintiff asserted claims
under the Georgia Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act ("RICO"). She alleged that the defendants engaged in a pattern of
criminal activity towards her and others from January 1985 through
November 1986, and that she suffered harm as a result. Reaugh also

128. Hanna v. McWilliams, 213 Ga. App. 648, 651, 446 S.E.2d 741, 744 (1994); Fort
Oglethorpe Assoc. v. Hails Constr. Co., 196 Ga. App. 663, 664, 396 S.E.2d 585, 586 (1990);
Benning Constr. Co. v. Lakeshore Plaza, 240 Ga. 426, 428, 241 S.E.2d 184, 186 (1977).
129. See, e.g., Waller v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 946 F.2d 1514 (10th Cir. 1991);
Thornton v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 886 F.2d 85, (4th Cir. 1989); see also Annotation, Validity
and Constructionof Statute TerminatingRight ofAction for Product-CausedInjury at Fixed
Period After Manufacture Sale or Delivery, 25 A.L.R. 4th 641. Thus a court applying
foreign law will likewise generally apply the foreign statute of ultimate repose and apply
its own statute of limitations.
130. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-71.
131. Id. § 9-3-51.
132. Id. § 51-1-11(b) & (c).
133. 214 Ga. App. 259, 447 S.E.2d 617 (1994).
134. Id. at 260, 447 S.E.2d at 619.
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asserted claims for fraud, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary
duty. Reaugh reached the age of majority on January 30, 1988 and filed
suit on December 3, 1991. The defendants moved for summary
judgment, asserting, among other things, that the claims were time
barred. The trial court granted summary judgment, holding that the
plaintiff's personal injury claims were barred by the general two year
statute of limitations applying to injuries to the person contained in
O.C.G.A. section 9-3-33. The trial court summarily avoided Reaugh's
RICO claims, concluding they were "without merit and subject to
summary judgment."3' 5
The court of appeals reversed, noting that O.C.G.A. section 9-3-33 is
merely a general statute of limitations that applies to claims for personal
injury in the absence of a more specific statute of limitations. The court
held that the special five year statute of limitations applicable to RICO
actions, O.C.G.A. section 16-14-8, applies. 136 Since the claim was filed
within five years of the plaintiff having attained majority, the claim was
not time barred. Similarly, the four year statute of limitations for fraud
and the six year statute of limitations for a breach of contract controlled.'3 7 Again, these claims were held not time barred.3 8
On the other hand, no specific statute of limitations provided the time
period within which Reaugh was to bring her claim for breach of
fiduciary duty.'3 9 Accordingly, the court must look to the nature of the
injury sustained in order to determine which limitations period
applies.4 Since the personal injury was alleged to have resulted from
the defendant's breach of fiduciary duty, the general- two year statute of
limitations barred the claim.""
To Toll or Not to Toll: Mental Incompetency. The court of
appeals reaffirmed the distinction between the statutory tolling
provisions for causes of action possessed by minors and causes of action
possessed by mentally incompetent persons in Price v. Department of
42
The former causes are tolled without exception
Transportation.'

135. Id. at 259-60, 447 S.E.2d at 618-19.
136, Id. at 260, 447 S.E.2d at 219. Compare O.C.G.A. § 16-14-8 with O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33
(1982).
137. Reaugh, 244 Ga. App. at 260,447 S.E.2d at 619. CompareO.C.G.A. § 16-14-8 with
O.C.G.A. §§ 9-3-24 (1982) (contracts) and 9-3-31 (1982) (fraud).
138. 244 Ga. App. at 260, 447 S.E.2d at 619.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. 214 Ga. App. 85, 88, 446 S.E.2d 749, 752 (1994).
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until the minor reaches majority."" The latter causes of action are
tolled only until: (1) capacity is regained; (2) a guardian is appointed
and begins to act; or (3) "until such time as one bona fide acting for him
of
as next friend thereafter, during the continuance of the disability 144
plaintiff, brings an 'action seeking recovery for the injury sustained."
The distinction is rational, the trial court noted, because a person's
status as a minor terminates at a definite time, while a person's status
as mentally incompetent may continue indefinitely.45
The court of appeals also held, in Moore v. Louis Smith Memorial
Hospital,'46 that although a malpractice claim is not tolled by the
plaintiff's mental incompetency, a claim is not necessarily for medical
malpractice simply because it arises from care provided by a health care
facility. 147 The court should instead determine whether the claim
"calls into question the conduct of a professional in his area of expertise."148 In this case, the plaintiff was injured while being moved from
her wheelchair to her bed. Since the act involved physical strength and
dexterity and not the exercise of medical judgment, it was not a claim
for medical malpractice. Thus, the jury was entitled to determine
mental incapacity existed so as to toll the statute
whether the plaintiff's
49
of limitations. 1

To Toll or Not to Toll: Fraud. Fraud which conceals the
defendant's tortious conduct, the plaintiff's injury, or the cause thereof
tolls the applicable statute of limitations until the plaintiff discovers the
conduct, injury or cause thereof."s° In Bynum v. Gregory, 5 ' the
plaintiffs were the parents of a child allegedly injured during her birth
on February 20, 1975 because of the defendants' negligence. The
parents filed suit on behalf of themselves and as guardians of their
minor daughter in February 1993. The parents sued the treating
obstetrician and his employer, Associates in Obstetrics & Gynecology,
P.C. ("Associates").

143. OC.G.A. § 9-3-90 (1982 & Supp. 1995). See Barnum v. Martin, 135 Ga. App. 712,
219 S.E.2d 341 (1975); Whalen v. Certain-Teed Prods. Corp., 108 Ga. App. 686, 687, 134
S.E.2d 528 (1963).
144. Price, 214 Ga. App. at 88,446 S.E.2d at 752; see also Cline v. Lever Bros. Co., 124
Ga. App. 22, 23, 183 S.E.2d 63 (1971).
145. Price, 214 Ga. App. at 87-88, 446 S.E.2d at 751.
146. 216 Ga. App. 299, 454 S.E.2d 190 (1995).
147. Id. at 299, 454 S.E.2d at 191-92.
148. Id., 454 S.E.2d at 192.
149. Id. at 300, 454 S.E.2d at 192.
150. Hill v. Fordham, 186 Ga. App. 354, 355, 367 S.E.2d 128, 129-30 (1988).
151. 215 Ga. App. 431, 450 S.E.2d 840 (1994).
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The defendants moved for summary judgment, contending that the
statute of limitations for a medical malpractice claim, O.C.G.A. section
9-3-73(b), barred the claims. The plaintiff alleged that the statute of
limitations was tolled by the defendants' fraud." 2
Immediately after birth, the child, a full-term female infant, was
diagnosed with a brain injury due to anoxia (lack of oxygen), with
convulsive seizures due to brain injury. The diagnosis ruled out
meningitis. Nonetheless, Dr. Eidson, an employee and stockholder of
Associates, told Mrs. Bynum that the injury was caused by a one in a
million case of meningitis and that the doctors were unable to prevent
it. Also, Dr. Gregory, the treating obstetrician at birth and an employee
stockholder of Associates, failed to tell Mrs. Bynum the true diagnosis
in a conversation about the birth-related problems. The plaintiffs in fact
found out for the first time from another doctor in 1991 that their
daughter never suffered from meningitis. The plaintiffs filed suit within
two years after discovering these facts. 1
The court of appeals held that fact issues existed as to whether the
defendants' non-disclosure and misrepresentations were sufficient to toll
the statute of limitations." 4 Given that the defendants failed to deny
that the misrepresentation and non-disclosure took place and produced
no evidence demonstrating a lack of fraudulent intent, one must wonder
why the court of appeals refused to hold the statute tolled as a matter
of law. The case sends the clear signal that such questions are
invariably left to the jury.
What Constitutes a Separate Act of Malpractice: The Doctrine
of "Reverse Relation-Back"? In Long v. Wallace,' the court of
appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the defendant
lawyer in a legal malpractice case."
The lawyer represented the
client in a 1986 trial for statutory rape, and the client/plaintiff alleged
that in the trial, the attorney/defendant committed malpractice. The
original trial took place in 1986 and the plaintiff did not file suit until
1992.57 The court held that claim barred because the statute of
limitations for legal malpractice is four years. 5 '
However, because the employment contract required the lawyer to
represent the client during and after trial, the plaintiff also alleged that

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. at 431-33, 450 S.E.2d at 840-42.
Id. at 432-33, 450 S.E.2d at 841-42.
Id. at 433, 450 S.E.2d at 842.
214 Ga. App. 466, 448 S.E.2d 229 (1994).
Id. at 468, 448 S.E.2d at 230.
Id. at 466, 448 S.E.2d at 229.
Id. at 467, 448 S.E.2d at 230.
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the lawyer's post-trial failure to assert his own ineffectiveness on direct
or habeas appeal constituted separate, subsequent acts of malpractice."5 9 The court of appeals held that while this inaction may have
constituted a failure of the lawyer to avoid the effect of his ultimate
breach or a failure to mitigate damages, it was not an act inflicting new
harm. Accordingly, such a claim would relate-back to the original
negligent act or acts, and the claim would be barred."'
B.

Statutes of Repose

The Perils of Dismissing and Renewing. In two survey period
decisions, Burns v. Radiology Associates of Gwinnett, PC.'6' and Love
v. Whirlpool Corp.,"62 both the court of appeals and supreme court held
that the medical malpractice and product liability statutes of repose bar
an otherwise proper renewal action brought pursuant to O.C.G.A. section
9-2-61 if the statute of repose has run before the renewed action was
filed."63 The courts reasoned that a renewed action is an action de
Accordingly, one cannot file a new action based upon an
novo.'
extinguished cause of action.' 5
Tolling Based on Fraud Revisited. Citing the age-old principal
that "the sun never sets on fraud," the court of appeals, in Bynum v.
Gregory and Beck v. Dennis," held that fraud tolls the medical
malpractice statute of repose just as it tolls the medical malpractice
statute of limitations.6 7 "The statute of ultimate repose should not
provide an incentive for a doctor or other medical professional to conceal

159. Id. at 467-68, 448 S.E.2d at 230.
160. Id. Generally, when one claim relates back to another claim, the relation back
operates to save another claim from the operation of the statute of limitations. For
example, a claim which arises out of the same transaction or occurrence as a claim filed
before the expiration of the statute of limitations, when asserted subsequent to the running
of the statute, relates back and is not barred. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-15(c) (1993).
161. 214 Ga. App. 76, 446 S.E.2d 788 (1994).
162. 264 Ga. 701, 449 S.E.2d 602 (1994).
163. Burns, 214 Ga. App. at 77, 446 S.E.2d at 789; Love, 264 Ga. at 705-06, 449 S.E.2d
at 606-07.
164. 214 Ga. App. at 77, 446 S.E.2d at 789; 264 Ga. at 705-06, 449 S.E.2d at 606-07.
165. Statutes of ultimate repose, therefore, can be said to extinguish the plaintiffs right
of action, whereas a statute of limitations merely affects the plaintiffs remedy. See
Hollingsworth v. Hubbard, 184 Ga. App. 121, 122, 361 S.E.2d. 12, 13 (1987).
166. 215 Ga. App. 728, 452 S.E.2d 205 (1994).
167. Bynum, 215 Ga. App. at 434, 450 S.E.2d at 842-43; Beck, 215 Ga. App. at 729-30,
452 S.E.2d at 206-07,
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[their] [sic] negligence with the assurance that after five years such
fraudulent conduct will insulate [them] [sic] from liability."' 68
Actions for Indemnification. Is a third party action for indemnification filed after the expiration of the applicable statute of ultimate
repose barred? The court of appeals addressed this issue in Gwinnett
Place Associates, L.P v. PharrEngineering,Inc.'69
In that case, the plaintiff sued Gwinnett Place Mall for injuries she
sustained in a slip and fall on a ramp outside a mall restaurant. The
mall filed a third party claim for indemnification against the engineering, construction, and architectural firms responsible for the design and
construction of the mall's sidewalks and ramps. The third party
defendants moved for summary judgment, citing O.C.G.A. section 9-35 1.17

O.C.G.A. section 9-3-51 is a statute of ultimate repose that bars claims
for injury to the person brought more than eight years after the
"substantial completion" of any "improvement to real property."' 7 ' The
claim must be based on "deficiency in the ...

planning, design,

specifications, supervision or observation of construction, or construction
of an improvement to real property .... ""'

The parties did not

dispute that the mall was substantially completed more than eight years
before the mall filed its third party claim. The mall argued that because
for injury to the person, it
a claim for indemnification was not a claim
173
was not subject to the statute of repose.
The court of appeals disagreed, relying on its recent decision in
Krasaeth v. Parker,174 which held that a claim for contribution was
subject to the medical malpractice statute of repose.' 75 The court

168.
169.

215 Ga. App. at 434, 450 S.E.2d at 842-43.
215 Ga. App. 53, 449 S.E.2d 889 (1994).

170. Id. at 53-54, 449 S.E.2d at 890.

171. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-51(a).
172. Id.
173. Gwinnett PlaceAssoc., L.P, 215 Ga. App. at 54, 449 S.E.2d at 890.
174. 212 Ga. App. 525, 441 S.E.2d 868 (1994).
175. See O.C.G.A. § 9-3-71(b) (1982 & Supp. 1995). In Krasaeth, the plaintiff settled
with one of many joint tortfeasors and, pursuant to that settlement, was assigned that
defendant's right to contribution. Krasaeth v. Parker, 212 Ga. App. 525, 525, 441 S.E.2d
868, 869 (1994). The applicable two year statute of limitations for bringing a medical
malpractice claim, O.C.G.A. § 9.3-71(a), had run on the plaintiff's claims against certain
joint tortfeasors, but the statute of limitations for an action for contribution allows twenty
years. O.C.G.A. §§ 51-12-32 and 23-2-71. The court held that the five year statute of repose
for medical malpractice claims applies even to claims for contribution if the claim for
contribution is dependant upon proof of professional negligence on the part of the joint
tortfeasor. 212 Ga. App. at 527, 441 S.E.2d at 870.
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reasoned that a claim for indemnification, dependant upon proof of
professional negligence on the part of the176joint tortfeasor, falls within the
scope of the statute of ultimate repose.
The Product Liability Statute of Repose. The supreme court
provided a much-needed explication of the applicability of the product
liability statute of ultimate repose during this survey period. In
Chrysler Corp. v. Batten,'77 the court delineated the reach of O.C.G.A.
section 51-1-11(b)(2) and (c). Those provisions provide the following
limitations:
(b)(2) No action shall be commenced pursuant to this subsection with
respect to an injury after ten years from the date of the first sale for
use or consumption of the personal property causing or otherwise
bringing about the injury ....
(c) The limitation of [subsection (b)(2)] regarding bringing an action
within ten years from the date of the first sale for use or consumption
of personal property shall also apply to the commencement of an action
claiming negligence of a manufacturer as the basis of liability, except
an action seeking to recover from a manufacturer for injuries or
damages arising out of the negligence of such manufacturer in
manufacturing products which cause a disease or birth defect, or
arising out of conduct which manifests a willful, reckless, or wanton
disregard for life or property. Nothing contained in this subsection
shall relieve a manufacturer from the duty to warn of a danger arising
from use of a product once that danger becomes known to the

manufacturer."
In Batten plaintiffs brought claims in 1990 against Chrysler based
upon allegations that the subject 1978 Chrysler LeBaron contained a
defective seatbelt retractor mechanism and that Chrysler negligently
failed to warn of this defect.179 The vehicle was first sold for use or
consumption in 1978, more than ten years before the lawsuit was filed.
Chrysler moved for summary judgment, arguing that the statute of
repose barred the plaintiffs' claims.'
The court held that, pursuant to the pertinent provisions of the
product liability statute of repose, whether a claim is barred depends
upon which of three types of claims is at issue.181 The statute provides

176. 215 Ga. App, at 527, 449 S.E.2d at 870.
177. 264 Ga. 723, 450 S.E.2d 208 (1994).
178. O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(b)(2) and (c).
179. 264 Ga. at 723-24, 450 S.E.2d at 210-11, 212. The plaintiff alleged that Chrysler
was strictly liable and liable for negligence because of the alleged defective design. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 725-26, 450 S.E.2d at 212.
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distinct rules of applicability (or non-applicability) depending upon
whether the claim is one for strict liability, negligence, or failure to
82
warn. 1
If the claim is based on a strict liability theory of defect, the claim is
barred without exception if it is filed after ten years from the date of
8
first sale for use or consumption."
' In Batten, therefore, the statute
of repose barred the plaintiffs' strict liability claims based upon the
alleged defective design of the seatbelt retractor mechanism. 84
If the claim is based upon negligent design or manufacture, the claim
is barred after ten years unless one of two exceptions apply.'
If the
claim is for injuries arising out of the negligence of a manufacturer in
placing upon the market a product which causes disease or birth defect,
the ten year statute of repose is inapplicable. 6 Also, the statute fails
to operate as a bar to an action if a product maker's misconduct
manifests a willful, reckless, or wanton disregard for life or property.8 7
This standard is almost indistinguishable from the standard for
awarding punitive damages in Georgia. In Batten, the court found no
evidence of such egregious misconduct by Chrysler, so the statute barred
the plaintiffs' negligence claims.'
If the claim is based upon the defendant's failure to warn when the
defendant has actual or constructive knowledge of the defect, the ten
8 9
year statute of repose does not apply."
In Batten, the plaintiffs'
claims that were based upon the defendants' failure to warn survived."
The defendants, and Justice Fletcher in his dissent, argued that the
failure to warn exception should be limited to cases where the defendant
possesses actual knowledge of the danger and nonetheless fails to
warn.'
As pointed out by the majority, such a construction ignores
the fact that for years the Georgia courts have recognized that a product
maker's duty to warn rests upon its actual or constructive knowledge of
the danger. The General Assembly, in enacting this exception to the

182.
183.
184.
185.

Id. at 723, 450 S.E.2d at 210-11.
Id. at 725, 450 S.E.2d at 212.
Id.
Id. at 725-26, 450 S.E.2d at 212.

186. Id.
187. Id.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. at 726, 450 S.E.2d at 212.
Id. at 727, 450 S.E.2d at 213.
Id.
Id. at 728, 450 S.E.2d at 214 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
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statute of repose, must be presumed to have been aware of this age-old
principal.'9 2
This construction also makes sense because a product maker is
charged with being the ultimate expert as to its own product. It would
be irrational to allow a product maker to close its eyes and ears once ten
years have passed since it foisted its product onto consumers. If a
manufacturer reasonably believes its product is still in the stream of
commerce and has reason to know of a danger which would otherwise
give rise to a duty to warn, there is no rational reason for this duty to
be lessened by the passage often years. Claims which arise strictly from
the sale of a product many years ago stand on a different footing than
failure to warn claims based upon more recently acquired knowledge.
IV. VENUE

During this survey period, the appellate courts decided one significant
case dealing with the issue of venue, Owens u. Pollock.' In that case,
the plaintiffs, shareholders in a closely held corporation, sued the
majority shareholders and the corporation for slander, breach of
fiduciary duties, and fraud. The plaintiffs filed the action in Gwinnett
County, basing venue on the residence of the defendant corporation." 4
None of the individual defendants resided in Gwinnett County, so venue
was only proper with respect to them by virtue of Georgia's joint
tortfeasor venue provision.' 95
The jury rendered its verdict against all the non-resident defendants
and for the corporate defendant, the only Gwinnett County defendant.
The individual defendants then raised the issue of improper venue and
moved to transfer. The plaintiffs contended that venue was proper as
to the legal claims asserted against the non-resident individual
defendants because the defendants had agreed to a consent order
granting certain equitable relief prior to trial. The order commanded the
parties to refrain from certain actions, to maintain and preserve certain
information, to produce certain information, and to suspend certain
disbursements of funds.'9
The plaintiffs argued that since venue existed for the equitable claims,
the legal claims were pendent under the now famous Natpar 7
doctrine. According to the landmark Natpar decision, "[Wihere a

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id. at 727, 450 S.E.2d at 213.
214 Ga. App. 107, 447 S.E.2d 325 (1994).
Id. at 107-08, 449 S.E.2d at 326-27.
Id. at 108, 449 S.E.2d at 327; GA. CONST. art. 6, § 2, para. 4.
Owens, 214 Ga. App. at 107-08, 447 S.E.2d at 326-27.
Natpar Corp. v. E.T. Kassinger, Inc., 258 Ga. 102, 104,365 S.E.2d 442,443 (1988).
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plaintiff brings suit in the same county on two claims arising from the
same transaction and the Georgia Constitution designates that county
as the venue for one of those claims, the trial court has the discretion to
entertain both claims." 198
The court of appeals disagreedY9' The problem with the plaintiffs'
argument was that the claims for equitable relief merely preserved or
brought to light the status quo and were accordingly only ancillary to
the plaintiffs' legal claims.2" In a colorful flurry, the court opined that
while Natparmodified the venue principal that "each tub must stand on
its own bottom, . . . it is still essential that at least one 'tub' should
'stand on its own bottom.'"2 0
V.

A.

PERSONAL JURISDICTION

The Long-Arm Statute

O.C.G.A. sections 9-10-91(2) and (3) (Tort Cases): Is Coe &
Payne Dead? In 1973, the Georgia Supreme Court interpreted
Georgia's Long-Arm Statute, O.C.G.A. section 9-10-91, in the case of Coe
& Payne Co. v. Wood-Mosaic Corp.2 ' Georgia's Long-Arm Statute that
controlled the Coe & Payne decision contained just one provision
granting extra-territorial personal jurisdiction to Georgia courts in tort
cases."° That provision allowed Georgia courts to exercise personal
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant who had committed a tortious
0 4
act or omission within this State."
The obvious question that arose under this statute was: "Is jurisdiction proper in Georgia when a non-resident defendant committed a
tortious act or omission in some other state, which act or omission
caused an injury in Georgia?" Other jurisdictions, interpreting similar
long-arm provisions, split.
The Illinois rule holds that a tort is not committed until an injury is
sustained. Therefore, the term tortious act or omission would encompass

198. Id. at 104, 365 S.E.2d 443-44.
199. Owens, 214 Ga. App. at 109, 447 S.E.2d at 328 (1994).

200. Id.
201. Id. at 110, 447 S.E.2d at 328.
202. 230 Ga. 58, 195 S.E.2d 399 (1973).

203. See O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(2) (1982 &Supp. 1995). O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(3) had not yet
become effective. See O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(3) (1982 & Supp. 1995).
204. O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(2).
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the place where the ultimate injury occurred. 2 ' The New York rule
holds that the term act or omission means just that, regardless of where
the ultimate injury takes place. 2'
In Coe & Payne, the Georgia Supreme Court followed the Illinois rule
in favor of broadening the State's power to protect its citizens who are
injured in this'State by the tortious conduct of an out of state defendant. 0 7 However, before Coe & Payne was actually decided the
General Assembly amended the Long-Arm Statute to add O.C.G.A.
section 9-10-91(3), which provides for jurisdiction over non-resident
defendants who commit a tortious act or omission outside Georgia which
causes injury in Georgia.0 8
That subsection, however, unlike O.C.G.A. section 9-10-91(2) (upon
which Coe & Payne was decided), is expressly limited to non-resident
defendants who regularly do or solicit business, engage in any other
persistent course of conduct, or derive substantial revenue from goods
used or consumed or services rendered in this State. 0 9 Is Coe & Payne
still good law in light of O.C.G.A. section 9-10-91(3)?
Cases decided after Coe & Payne and after O.C.G.A. section 9-10-91(3)
took effect consistently hold that O.C.G.A. section 9-10-91(2) still permits
Georgia courts to exercise jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the
maximum extent permitted by due process, including nonresident
defendants who have committed a tortious act or omission outside this
State which has caused an injury in Georgia.210
During the survey period, the court of appeals decided White v.
Roberts."' In that case, the plaintiffs had bought a horse from a
Nebraska couple, and the horse had been examined by a Nebraska
veterinarian before the sale. When the horse turned out lame, the
plaintiffs sued the sellers and the veterinarian. The veterinarian moved
to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 2
Because the veterinarian indisputably conducted no business, engaged
in no consistent course of conduct, and did not derive substantial
revenue from services rendered in Georgia, O.C.G.A. section 9-10-91(3)

205.
206.
207.

208.
209.
210.
(1979);
211.
212.

Coe & Payne Co., 230 Ga. at 60, 195 S.E.2d at 400-01.
Id. at 59-60, 195 S.E.2d at 400.
Id. at 61, 195 S.E.2d at 401.

See O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(3).
Id.
See, e.g., Clarkson Power Flow, Inc. v. Thompson, 244 Ga. 300, 260 S.E,2d 9
Timberland Equip., Ltd. v. Jones, 146 Ga. App. 589, 246 S.E.2d 709 (1978).
216 Ga. App. 273, 454 S.E.2d 584 (1995).
Id. at 273, 454 S.E.2d at 585.
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was inapplicable." 3 The plaintiffs, therefore, argued that jurisdiction
was appropriate under O.C.G.A. section 9-10-91(2) and Coe & Payne.1 4
The court of appeals summarily rebuked this argument, holding that
"It]he statutory interpretation of [O.C.G.A. section 9-10-91(2)] has been
superseded" by the addition of O.C.G.A. section 9-10-91(3). 1 "The
rule that controls is our statute, which requires that an out-of-state
State of Georgia before he can
defendant must do certain acts within 21the
6
be subjected to personal jurisdiction."
Citing Gust v. Flint2 7 and ignoring the cases which have followed
Coe & Payne since O.C.G.A. section 9-10-91(3) was enacted, the court
held that the relative merits of the Illinois rule versus the New York
rule were not dispositive.2' This language would seem to indicate
that Coe & Payne's extension of long-arm jurisdiction to the limits of due
process has been retracted-over twenty years after the enactment of
O.C.G.A. section 9-10-91(3).
However, the death of Coe & Payne should not be lamented just yet.
Ironically, only a few months before the court of appeals decided White,
the very same panel, Judges McMurray, Pope, and Smith, decided the
case of Taeger Enterprises, Inc. v. Herdlein Technologies, Inc.21 9 In
that case, the court cited Coe & Payne for the proposition that "a
'tortious' act is a composite of both negligence and damage, and if
damage occurred within the state then the tortious act occurred within
the state within the meaning of... the Long-Arm Statute."22 The
court upheld dismissal because the defendants had no contacts with
Georgia, as they committed no acts or omissions in this State, and the
injury was not suffered in this State.221 Perhaps, therefore, the court's
statements in White, which seemingly jettisoned Coe & Payne, were mere
dicta, as the defendant veterinarian in that case
222 had insufficient
contacts with Georgia even to satisfy due process.

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id. at 275, 454 S.E.2d at 587.
Id., 454 S.E.2d at 586.
Id.
Id.
257 Ga. 129, 356 S.E.2d 587 (1987).
White, 216 Ga. App. at 275, 454 S.E.2d at 586-87.
213 Ga. App. 740, 445 S.E.2d 848 (1994).
Id. at 748, 445 S.E.2d at 855.
Id., 445 S.E.2d at 856.
White, 216 Ga. App. at 274-75, 454 S.E.2d at 586.
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O.C.G.A. section 9-10-91(1) (Contract actions). O.C.G.A. section
9-10-91(1) allows Georgia courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants who "transact any business" in Georgia. 23
The court of appeals reaffirmed during this survey period that this
provision only applies to actions based on breach of contract and not to
tort actions.224
The court of appeals also recently reaffirmed that, in a contract case,
in order to meet the transacts any business provision, a more systematic
course of conduct is necessary than is generally required in a tort
case.225 In Taeger, a subcontractor sued the president of a nonresident
corporate contractor and a nonresident corporate consultant. 22 1 The
court held that two visits by the contractor's president to the contract job
site located in Georgia were too fortuitous and attenuated to support
jurisdiction under the Long-Arm Statute.227
The court disregarded the plaintiff's speculation regarding the
contractor's president's intent in making the visits and the plaintiff's
unsupported conclusions that the contractor's president had dealt with
the plaintiff during those visits because the plaintiff failed to support
either assertion with any facts.228 Any Georgia contacts of the nonresident contractor (who was not a party to the action) were not attributable
to the consultant, regardless of the plaintiff's ignorance of the contractor's and consultant's separate corporate existence and regardless of the
fact that the two corporations shared office space, secretaries, and
telephone numbers, because the two entities in fact were distinct legal
entities.2 9 Once the court stripped away this speculative veneer of
contacts, the case fell within the established precedent that one or a few
visits to this State in connection with a contract are not enough to
establish jurisdiction under the Long-Arm Statute.3 0

223. O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(1).
224. Allen v. Black, 214 Ga. App. 450, 447 S.E.2d 718 (1994).
225. See Taeger Enters., Inc. v. Herdlein Technologies, Inc. at 213 Ga. App. 740, 445
S.E.2d 848 (1994).
226. 213 Ga. App. at 740, 445 S.E.2d at 850-51.
227. Id. at 747, 445 S.E.2d at 855.

228. Id.
229. Id.
230.

Id., 445 S.E.2d at 545.
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In Habersham Metal Products Co. v. Huntsville Fastener & Supply,
Inc.,231 the nonresident defendant's activities in Georgia were ongoing
and continuous. In that case, while the out-of-state seller of fasteners
did not solicit the plaintiff-business, it maintained an ongoing relation
with that business. It continuously corresponded with the plaintiff in
Georgia, by mail and by phone. It regularly sent its products to the
plaintiff in Georgia, and it sent the plaintiff catalogs and sample
products. After the dispute giving rise to the lawsuit arose, representatives of the defendant came to Georgia to negotiate a resolution and,
perhaps, to discuss ongoing business relations.23 2 The court held that
the defendant was transacting business in Georgia and subject to
jurisdiction here on the plaintiff's contract claim.2 3
The fact that a party to a contract has executed a choice of law
provision selecting Georgia law is also insufficient, standing alone, to
confer jurisdiction over a non-resident under this provision of the LongArm Statute. 34
The transacts any business provision of the Long-Arm Statute is
perhaps the most enigmatic provision in the statute. To show that
jurisdiction is proper, a litigant must develop the facts to show that more
contacts exist than attenuated correspondence and visits to Georgia. In
this regard, no well settled "test" presently exists. Plaintiffs must
simply show in the record as many such contacts as possible, distinguish
any which are different from contacts the courts have previously held to
be insufficient, add them all up, and hope the court agrees that
jurisdiction exists.
B.

Consent to Jurisdiction
Can a party consent ahead of time, when he enters into a contract, to
be subject to the personal jurisdiction of this State? In Apparel
Resources, International,Ltd. v. Amerisig Southeast, Inc.,23 the court
of appeals answered in the affirmative. In that case, the dispute
involved a printing contract the parties had entered. In that contract,
the forum selection clause provided that the defendant consented to
jurisdiction in Georgia. 36 The court reasoned that because a party can
waive personal jurisdiction, unlike subject matter jurisdiction which

231. 216 Ga. App. 646, 455 S.E.2d 356 (1995).
232. Id. at 646-47, 455 S.E.2d at 356-57.
233. Id. at 647, 455 S.E.2d at 357.
234. Apparel Resources, Int'l, Ltd. v. Amerisig Southeast, Inc., 215 Ga. App. 483, 485,
451 S.E.2d 113, 115 (1994).
235. 215 Ga. App. at 483, 451 S.E.2d at 113.
236. Id., 451 S.E.2d at 113-14.
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cannot be waived, nothing prevents a party from doing so even before
the dispute arose.237
VI.

DISCOVERY PRACTICE

A. The Inter-Relation of the Work Product Doctrine and Discovery
Pertainingto Expert Witnesses
Perhaps one of the most significant cases of the survey period was
McKinnon v. Smock. 3 ' In division one of that case, the Georgia
Supreme Court held that the attorney-client privilege does not prevent
disclosure of the identity of documents reviewed by a party in preparation for his deposition. 239 Because the attorney-client privilege only
protects communications between attorney and client and because the
identity of documents reviewed in preparation for a deposition in no way
constitutes such communications, the privilege was deemed inapplicable.24
In division two, the court, perhaps more importantly, also held that
the opinion work product doctrine prevents disclosure of a correspondence between an attorney and an expert to the extent the correspondence contains opinion work product.24
The court interpreted the
language of O.C.G.A. section 9-11-26(b)(3), which sets forth the work
product doctrine, and O.C.G.A. section 9-11-26(b)(4), which outlines
discovery which may be had from an opponent's expert.242 In its
opinion, the court parsed the language of O.C.G.A. section 9-11-26(b)(3),
which seems on its face to expressly limit the work product doctrine in
situations involving discovery from an opposing expert.' 4
O.C.G.A. section 9-11-26(b)(3), the work product doctrine, by its own
terms, is subject to O.C.G.A. section 9-11-26(b)(4) concerning discovery
from experts. 44 O.C.G.A. section 9-11-26(b)(4) allows discovery of the
identity of experts expected to be called at trial, of the facts known by
those experts, opinions held, and grounds underlying those opinions,
even though all these matters were acquired and developed in anticipation of litigation. 245 For years, practitioners assumed that once a

237.
238.
239.

Id. at 484, 451 S.E.2d at 114.
264 Ga. 375, 445 S.E.2d 526 (1994).
Id. at 376, 445 S.E.2d at 527.

240. Id.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

Id. at 377-78, 445 S.E.2d at 528.
Id. at 378, 445 S.E.2d at 528.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-26(b)(3) (1993).
Id. § 9-11-26(b)(4).
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document or correspondence was provided to an expert, it was discoverable, notwithstanding the work product doctrine.
The court, however, distinguished between ordinary work product and
opinion work product.246 Opinion work product, defined as the "mental
impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories" of the lawyer, is
somehow and for some reason not stated by the court, exempt from being
subject to O.C.G.A. section 9-11-26(b)(4).247
The court held that the work product doctrine is only subject to the
provision concerning discovery from opposing experts in that the party
seeking discovery need not show substantial need and undue hardship
If the materials contain opinion work
to obtain the discovery.24
product, however, the materials are exempt from discovery, and O.C.G.A.
section 9-11-26(b)(4) is then subject to O.C.G.A. section 9-11-26(b)(3),
even though the statute provides otherwise.249
The court held that once a lawyer shows that his client has a
substantial need for protected work product and that undue hardship
would result if discovery were not obtained, the court should determine
in camera whether the documents contain opinion work product and are
therefore, immune from discovery."
It would seem that from the majority's analysis of the work product
doctrine, the defendant, in division one, should have objected to the
disclosure of documents relied upon in preparation for a deposition based
upon the opinion work product doctrine. To the extent the sequence or
selection of particular documents reflected the attorney's opinion work
product, it would arguably be exempt from discovery under the
majority's analysis in division two.
Justice Fletcher, joined by Chief Justice Hunt, dissented."' They
pointed out that the majority's holding flies in the face of the statute's
plain language.25 The holding also, according to the dissent, undermines the age-old principal in Georgia that a party is entitled to full
discovery from expert witnesses, so as to allow a thorough and sifting
cross-examination.2 53

246.
247.
248.
249.
26(b)(4)
250.
251.
252.
253.

264 Ga. at 378, 445 S.E.2d at 528.
Id.
Id.
Id. Compare O.C.G.A. § 9-11-26(b)(3) which seems to make all of O.C.G.A_ § 9-11"subject to" its provisions, not just the first sentence of 9-11-26(b)(4).
264 Ga. at 378, 445 S.E.2d at 528.
Id. at 378-81, 445 S.E.2d at 528-30. (Fletcher, J., dissenting.)
Id. at 379, 455 S.E.2d at 529.
Id. at 379-80, 455 S.E.2d at 529-30.
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Psychiatrist-PatientPrivilege
In Plunkett v. Ginsburg,"4 the court of appeals held that communications between a psychiatrist or psychologist and patient are absolutely
privileged from discovery.2 5' Placing one's mental condition in issue
in a case does not waive this absolute privilege, as this waiver is
statutorily created," and the same statute exempts psychiatric
records from this waiver."' The court did hold that putting the
psychiatrist on the stand to testify concerning the patient's condition
waives the privilege.2 58

B.

C. Withdrawal of Requests for Admission
O.C.G.A. section 9-11-36 allows a party to propound requests for
admission of facts so as to narrow the issues for trial. If a party fails to
respond to a request for admission, the request is taken as admitted. 259
O.C.G.A. section 9-11-36(b) allows withdrawal of such an admission
"when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved
thereby and the party who obtained the admission fails to satisfy the
court that withdrawal or amendment will prejudice him in maintaining
his action or defense on the merits."2"
In Rowland v. Tsay,261 the court of appeals explained what this
language means. In that case, the plaintiff buried requests for
admissions within his responses to the defendant's requests for
production of documents. The defendant overlooked the requests for
admission, and after thirty days, the requests were deemed admitted.
Upon discovering this omission, the defendant moved to withdraw
certain admissions, attaching new responses to the requests along with
testimony by affidavit and deposition showing that the responses were
meritorious. The trial court allowed the motion, and the court of appeals
affirmed. The evidence negating the admissions showed that their
withdrawal would subserve the merits. 2
The plaintiff was not prejudiced because one is never unfairly
prejudiced by being deprived of a judgment and being forced to go to
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217 Ga. App. 20, 456 S.E.2d 595 (1995).
Id. at 21, 456 S.E.2d at 597.
See O.C.G.A. § 24-9-40 (1995).
Id.
217 Ga. App. at 21, 456 S.E.2d at 597.
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-36 (1993).
Id. § 9-11-36(b).
213 Ga. App. 679, 445 S.E.2d 822 (1994).
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The
trial on the merits, as opposed to winning on a technicality."
court made it clear that a party "has no right to a judgment based on
false 'admissions' effected merely because [a party] was late in answering ... requests for admission, for such false admissions do not subserve
the merits.""6
VII.

CONCLUSION

This survey is by no means all inclusive, as neither space nor time
permitted such an exhaustive analysis. Nonetheless, the authors hope
their insights and observations prove useful to readers of this survey.

263. 213 Ga. App. at 680-81, 445 S.E.2d at 823.
264. Id. at 681, 445 S.E.2d at 823 (emphasis added).

